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Abstract: The susceptibility of WiFi networks to Rogue Access Point attacks derives from the lack of identity for 
802.11 devices. The most common means of detecting these attacks in current research is through tracking 
the credentials or the location of unauthorised and possibly malicious APs. In this paper, the authors outline 
a method of distinguishing WiFi Access Points using 802.11 MAC layer management frame traffic profiles. 
This system does not require location estimation or credential tracking techniques as used in current 
research techniques, which are known to be inaccurate. These characteristic management traffic profiles are 
shown to be unique for each device, tantamount to a MAC identity. The application of this technique to 
solving Rogue AP attacks under the constraints of an open access, public WiFi environment is discussed 
with the conclusion that the identity is practically very difficult to forge. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most insidious attacks perpetrated against 
WLAN networks is the Rogue Access Point (Rogue 
AP), whereby an attacker masquerades as a 
legitimate AP in order to compromise the security of 
unsuspecting clients. These types of attack are 
considered to be some of the most dangerous threats 
to WiFi (Shetty, et al., 2007). (Ma, et al., 2007) 
categorises Rogues AP into one of four classes; 
  Improperly configured AP,  
 Unauthorised AP,  
 Phishing AP,  
 Compromised AP. 
Detection of unauthorised APs is the most 
common class addressed by research into Rogue 
APs (Beyah, et al., 2004). The existence of poorly 
configured APs in practice is outlined in (Percoco, 
2010), where “poor security settings” is one of the 
top two threat vectors in practical cyber security 
instances.  Investigations into detecting phishing and 
compromised APs are lacking in current research, 
although they are considered a technically difficult 
but growing threat (Percoco, 2010). 
One of the most common measures of identity in 
WLAN systems in current research is the RSSI 
(Received Signal Strength Indicator) of packets. The 
authors in (Tao, et al., 2008) and (Faria & Cheriton, 
2006) suggest that, using a distributed set of sensors, 
sufficient RSSI data can be gathered to provide 
identification. This relies on different physical 
locations creating slight variations in traffic patterns; 
however this is only applied to clients and not APs. 
There is disagreement on the usefulness of RSSI 
in practical experiments. The authors in (Faria & 
Cheriton, 2006) and (Ma, et al., 2008) conclude that 
use of RSSI as a WLAN location indicator is flawed 
as multipath effects and AP specific processing of 
RSSI frame values severely impact results and make 
them unreliable. Furthermore, in (Nagarajan, et al., 
2010), it is suggested that attackers, knowing RSSI 
is used as a detection metric, can alter their 
transmission power in frequent intervals in order to 
defeat the detection algorithm. Thus the usefulness 
of RSSI as a metric for absolute identification in 
Rogue APs is uncertain and a more robust 
identification method is required. 
In (Shrivaraj, et al., 2008) packet inter-arrival 
time is used to detect Rogue APs using a Hidden 
Markov Model, however the results are based on 
Layer 3 information, not Layer 2. A similar system 
 is proposed in (Franklin, et al., 2006) where inter-
frame spacing between probe requests in a WLAN is 
suggested as an indicator of the device driver in use, 
although it has only been applied to clients rather 
than APs. The distinction between clients and APs 
here is important, as the traffic handled by a client is 
addressed to them alone, while inter-arrival times for 
APs may be affected by having to process frames for 
other network users. The use of layer 2 frame inter-
arrival times to identify DoS attacks in WiFi 
networks has already been shown by the authors 
(Milliken & Marshall, 2012). A more reliable 
technique for detecting Rogue APs is alluded to in 
(Beyah & Venkataraman, 2011) as “Irrefutable 
device identification through traffic characteristics”. 
2 AP IDENTITY AT LAYER 2 
Identity in the context of this work is defined as the 
ability to distinguish between two devices based on 
intrinsic attributes which are not reliant on their 
reported identity, i.e. the MAC address. Thus whilst 
it is possible for a malicious attacker to copy the 
MAC address, it should be impossible for them to 
copy these intrinsic device attributes. 
The use of Layer 2 management frame traffic 
from WiFi networks has many positive attributes for 
research applications. Firstly, this traffic is broadcast 
in plaintext in all networks. As this Layer 2 traffic is 
devoid of any encryption, this means it can be 
collected without any privacy or confidentiality 
concerns, which is often a major barrier to 
performing live WiFi network investigations. 
Previous work by (Milliken, et al., 2012) 
outlined a Layer 2 data collection system which has 
been deployed in live environments for traffic 
analysis and security research. Using this traffic it is 
possible to investigate identity at WiFi Layer 2. This 
dataset was collected from a public, open-access 
WiFi rollout in the Sunway Pyramid shopping mall 
in Kuala Lumpur (Figure 1). 
Table 1 presents a breakdown of management 
frame metrics for 3 APs within range of MS#1 in 
Figure 1. The two most common management frame 
types are considered to be; Beacons and Probe 
Request / Response exchanges. An exchange is is 
complete if the request and reply conversation is 
complete, i.e. both the request and response have 
been received correctly (Milliken, et al., 2012). 
Exchange intervals (for probes) and packet inter-
arrival times (for beacons) can be calculated by a 
client based on the traffic from an AP and is 
dependent on two unique factors; AP processing 
time and client-AP channel. 
AP processing time concerns the time for an AP 
to process and transmit a packet and depends on the 
equipment, firmware and load at that point in time. 
The combination of these factors means that 
processing time is subtly different for every AP and 
can be used as a basis for prescribing an AP identity. 
The client–AP channel factor concerns the subtle 
differences in packet reception depending on 
proximity between a client and AP. The authors 
have previously demonstrated in (Milliken & 
Marshall, 2012) and (Milliken, et al., 2012) that data 
collected from different locations is statistically 
different even if these locations are in very close 
proximity, as in Figure 1. This alters how the traffic 
is received at each observation location, which can 
be used as a further basis for identity. 
Table 1: Per AP Information for MS#1 (K1 dataset). 
Management 
Frame Metrics 
AP#1 AP#2 AP#3 
# Packets 5.7M 4.7M 17.0M 
% Data Packets 15.8 56.4 38.3 
% Management 
Packets 
79.5 40.4 60.4 
% Control Packets 4.73 3.23 1.33 
# Beacons 3.9M 1.7M 7.8M 
# Full Probe 
Exchanges 
65.5k 40.3k 194k 
Av. Beacon 
Interval(s) 
0.231 0.967 0.222 
Av. Probe Exchange 
Interval(s) 
0.0467 0.0373 0.0194 
 
Information from Table 1 shows that, as 
predicted, many of the traffic attributes are distinct 
for each AP (AP#1 vs. AP#2 vs. AP#3) collected at 
a specific observation location (MS #1). The 
“running” average (Av.) values in Table 1 represent 
the exponentially weighted moving average, where 
each new interval is weighted against the previous 
Figure 1: Data Capture System Layout (Milliken & 
Marshall, 2012). 
 intervals without any being discarded. This makes 
the average more resistant to minor outliers. To 
combat major outliers, a removal threshold (>60s) 
has been applied to improve the stability of the 
mean. Exchanges of this length are deemed to be 
erroneous factors attributed to excessive impulse 
interference or temporary reflective agents. Figures 
2 and 3 show the values of these running means for 
 Beacon intervals and Probe Exchange time intervals 
over the first 500 observations (i.e. captured frames) 
for MS#1 in the K1 dataset. The first conclusion 
from the data is that beacons present a high degree 
of variance. This is attributed to their constant 
broadcast nature making them more sensitive to 
interference. Probe information is very stable which 
is attributed to their scarcity relative to beacon 
frames. Since probe frames are less frequent than 
beacons, their transmission over the air is less likely 
to coincide with impulse interference. 
Comparing Figures 2 and 3 (MS#1) to Figures 4 
and 5 (MS#2) it is observed that although the 
average values are different, the general 
characteristics for each frame type are consistent, i.e. 
the frame averages display a settling time, followed 
by a smoothly changing average which may overlap 
with other observed averages for other APs at 
different times. This confirms that these attributes 
can be tracked over time and that they are not the 
same at all observation locations. 
3 ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT 
From Figures 2-5 it is possible to visually 
differentiate between each of the APs and each 
observation location (MS). However reliance on 
visual distinction could result in disagreement 
between different observers as to what constitutes 
legitimate separation between the APs. A more 
reliable, repeatable and programmable method is 
applied here to systematically determine the 
distinction between the AP frame averages. 
3.1 Training Period Estimation 
Each of the averages in Figures 2-5 exhibits a 
training period, after which minor outliers will have 
been absorbed and a settled mean is achieved. Once 
the end of this period has been reached then the trace 
stabilises and exhibits smooth transitions. This 
interference is considered distinct from that removed 
by the (>60s) outlier threshold outlined previously. 
The less extreme transitions may reflect changes in 
client loading or the state of the network 
environment such as greater footfall acting as 
reflectors. The training period is governed by the 
following algorithm:  
1. Calculate the current “running” mean and 
standard deviation of the intervals observed,  
2. Establish the maximum and minimum limits of 
accuracy for training period (here they are 
chosen as 10% of the standard deviation), 
3. If the running mean is observed as being within 
the training bounds for 10 consecutive 
observations, the training period is deemed to 
have ended. 
The values of 10% for the accuracy of the 
standard deviation and 10 consecutive observations 
of conformity are applied here based on human 
observations of multiple traces. The impact of 
varying this value has been investigated and the 
choice of 10% and 10 observations closely matches 
visual estimations. While this continues to introduce 
human error, since an observer could select 11% 
rather than 10% or 20 rather than 10 observations 
and get different results, this approach instead 
reduces the debate to accuracy rather than 
repeatability.  
Table 2: Training Period Estimation for MS#1,MS#2. 
(OC: Observations until Cut-Off, TS: Timeframe until 
Settle) 
Beacon 
MS#1 MS#2 
#OC TS (s) #OC TS (s) 
AP #1  85 14.37 44 7.57 
AP#2 47 8.33 43 9.40 
AP#3 63 425.47 43 28.59 
Probe 
MS#1 MS#2 
#OC TS (s) #OC TS (s) 
AP #1  53 90.8 90 102.71 
AP#2 55 47.18 46 43.77 
AP#3 181 257.18 54 54.53 
 
Applying this algorithm to the traffic for MS#1 
and MS#2 produces Table 2, which outlines the 
estimated end-point of the training times for each 
AP. These training times are exclusive to this dataset 
and collection time however this process can be 
applied to other datasets or APs. Thus is more 
flexible and reliable than using human estimation.  
Each of the AP mean interval traces for each MS 
exhibits a unique settling point after a set amount of 
observations. The range of this observation value 
can extend from as few as 47 and as many as 181 
depending on the relative stability of the averages 
observed. An anticipated time until these numbers of 
observations are achieved is given in Table 2, based 
on the average observation rate at each AP. This 
indicates that the beacon rate settling is relatively 
prompt due to the high frequency of the packets 
whilst probe rate settling takes longer. 
 3.2 Distinction Period Estimation 
The end of the training period establishes the 
number of observations after which the AP averages 
 can be considered stable. Due to the possibility of 
drift however it is not necessarily the case that APs 
can be distinguished at all times, so identity may not 
be available at all times. The algorithm employed to 
determine AP distinction is:  
1. Determine the upper and lower limits for the 
mean of each AP by adding and subtracting a 
proportion of the current standard deviation 
from it (10% here),  
2. If the upper bound for AP1 is below the lower 
bound of AP2 then they are distinct at that 
observation,  
3. Alternatively, if the lower bound for AP1 is 
above the upper bound of AP2 then they are 
distinct at that observation,  
4. If the AP under consideration is both settled 
and distinct from all other APs under test then 
identity is considered to be prescribed for that 
AP at that time for that observation location. 
This process provides a quantifiable means of 
determining if APs are distinguishable and over 
what percentage of the operating time, which is 
shown in Table 3. The information in the table 
indicates that the APs can be distinguished for up to 
99% of the total observations for both probes and 
beacons. The distinction results are less impressive 
for probe exchanges, for which the ability to 
separate the APs drops to as low as 12% for AP#2 - 
AP#3 in MS#2. This indicates that some locations 
may exhibit black spots for frame reception. 
Table 3: Identity Availability for MS#1 and MS#2. 
(PID: Prescribed 
IDentity) 
MS#1 MS#2 
B’con Probe B’con Probe 
First Observation 
with PID  
85 181 44 102 
AP 1–2 PID  
Time (%) 
75.75 99.06 99.81 92.75 
AP 1–3 PID  
Time (%) 
99.94 47.43 99.93 94.8 
AP 2–3 PID  
Time (%) 
99.94 99.94 99.93 12.3 
 
The disparity in the distinction results for MS#1 
and MS#2 in Table 3 shows that difference in 
placement location plays a key role in the 
application of this identity system. The observation 
locations of MS#1 and MS#2 are quite close in 
proximity yet the orientation difference between the 
two provides sufficiently different data to allow 
identity prescription. This indicates that searching 
for a suitable location within the deployment 
environment has a critical effect on the ability to 
prescribe identity. Investigations of how to select 
these positions are considered for future work. 
Combination of more than one detector in an 
environment would bypass this deficiency, as shown 
by the different performance levels per MS location. 
Each of the routers tested have been produced by 
a different manufacturer. The authors have no reason 
to believe that any devices exist for which this 
technique does not apply, although testing is 
necessarily limited by the environment available. 
The testing environment is believed to be a typical 
representation of open access networking 
environments and hence the results from this work 
should be broadly applicable. 
3.3 Rogue AP Discussion 
This experiment demonstrates that live network 
environments contain subtleties in traffic reception 
that can be used for security research. Due to the 
live, operational nature of the network under test it 
was not possible to obtain permission to carry out a 
Rogue AP attack at this location. Nonetheless the 
information available provides insight into the 
effectiveness of the system under Rogue AP attack. 
The beaconing rates for each of the APs in 
Figures 2-5 are set to 100ms intervals. Each device 
is attempting to broadcast beacons at precisely this 
interval, however due to processing and channel 
characteristics they exhibit unique traffic deviations 
from the viewpoint of any connected client. 
Over both monitoring locations (MS#1 or MS 
#2) the distinction level between these APs was 
discernible between 75% and 99% of the testing 
time. This is in spite of the mean values for Figures 
2-5 for APs 1 and 2 being visually very similar. This 
demonstrates that small differences in beaconing 
interval are perpetuated over time and are an 
identifying factor of the device itself. 
A similar feature can be attributed to probe 
exchange intervals. For every AP, probe responses 
will be replied to as soon as possible, rather than at a 
set rate (as with beacons). This is more likely to be 
susceptible to variation due to loading in the AP, 
since processing will slow as additional tasks need 
to be carried out concurrently, e.g. serving multiple 
connected clients. It is particularly evident in Figure 
3 that these response levels are quite different and 
stable over time, allowing for minor fluctuations. 
The identity system proposed here would be very 
difficult for a knowledgeable attacker (one who 
knows the detection criteria) to combat. It has been 
demonstrated here that location plays a key role in 
the observed identity characteristics. It would be 
very difficult for any Rogue AP to masquerade this 
 information, as they would have to be in exactly the 
same physical position as the legitimate AP. Even 
were this to be achieved, the differences in frame 
processing of different manufacturers would need to 
be discovered and masqueraded as well. At worst 
this raises the bar for potential Rogue AP attacks. 
In practice a client could employ this technique 
to detect Rogue APs using the following method: 1) 
Client connects to a legitimate AP, 2) After the 
training time has bypassed the client has created the 
AP fingerprint, 3) Should a Rogue AP now appear, 
the client will be able to distinguish the new 
fingerprint even if the Rogue AP masquerades all 
available attributes of the legitimate AP. 
This process would have to be carried out every 
time a client connects to an AP, even if the 
fingerprint has been previously known. Only one 
visit to an AP is required to generate the fingerprint, 
however due to the channel characteristics changing 
with location and time they must be generated on 
every new connection. Accounting for user mobility 
remains for future work. This technique could be 
used in addition to alternative Rogue AP detection 
techniques to improve detection confidence. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Rogue APs present a significant threat to public 
WiFi infrastructures and their users, which current 
detection systems aim to defeat by monitoring 
differences in RSSI. These systems are shown to be 
insufficient by other research works. This work 
presents a new method of determining identification 
for WiFi APs, employing a combination of WiFi 
packet average intervals for beacons and probe 
exchanges to gauge identifying averages for APs. 
This layer 2 information has been shown to be 
received differently at different distances and 
orientations to the source of the traffic, which can be 
used to attribute identity to a specific AP from that 
collection location.  
The fingerprinting technique employed here is 
dependent on two characteristics, 1) AP – user 
channel and 2) Internal AP processing. Assessing 
the relative contribution to fingerprinting of these 
two attributes remains for future work. Attribution 
of this identity system has been shown to be 
available in a live location for up to 99% of 
operational lifetime potentially within 9 seconds of 
client-AP connection. 
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